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Abstract—The data collected from Internet of Things (IoT)
devices on various emissions or pollution, can have a significant
economic value for the stakeholders. This makes it prone to
abuse or tampering and brings forward the need to integrate
IoT with a Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to collect, store,
and protect the IoT data. However, DLT brings an additional
overhead to the frugal IoT connectivity and symmetrizes the IoT
traffic, thus changing the usual assumption that IoT is uplink-
oriented. We have implemented a platform that integrates DLTs
with a monitoring system based on narrowband IoT (NB-IoT).
We evaluate the performance and discuss the tradeoffs in two
use cases: data authorization and real-time monitoring.
Index Terms—Distributed Ledger Technologies, Blockchain,
Transparency, Narrowband Internet of Things, Environment
Monitoring, Air Pollution.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important element in the process of combating climate
change and protecting public health is the reliable and trust-
worthy measurement of various emissions and air pollutants.
Prime examples include CO2 and NOx, for which monitoring
systems based on Internet of Things (IoT) technology have
been reported in [1]. The emission information is critical
and can have a significant economic value, such that the
stakeholders have incentives to manipulate the data. The
way this information from IoT-based monitoring systems is
stored and collected raises concerns about data integrity, trust,
security, transparency, and public availability. For instance, in
IoT deployments, the measured data are either centralized or
spread out across different heterogeneous parties. These data
can be both public or private, which makes it difficult to
validate their origin and consistency. Besides, querying and
performing operations on the data becomes a challenge due to
the incompatibility between different application programming
interfaces (APIs). For instance, Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (NGOs), Public and Private sectors, and industrial
companies may use different data types and databases, which
leads to difficulties when sharing the data.
Data authorization represents another critical component in
many monitoring applications, in which the validity of the
received information is critical. To this end, IoT monitoring
systems often rely on an intermediary entity to validate the
device signatures, e.g., a certificate authority (CA) server,
which suffers from the issue of a single point of failure. As
a result, the data from authenticated devices are vulnerable
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to tampering using, for example, man-in-the-middle attacks
against the CA server.
Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) are positioned as
a key enabler for trusted and reliable distributed monitoring
systems, since these support the immutable and transparent
information sharing among involved untrusted parties [2]. In
DLTs, the authentication process relies on consensus among
multiple nodes in the network. While the terms DLT and
Blockchain will be used interchangeably throughout this paper,
Blockchains are a type of DLT, where chains of blocks are
made up of digital pieces of information called transactions
and every node maintains a copy of the ledger. Therefore,
in a Blockchain-enabled IoT network, transactions contain,
for example, environmental sensing data, or monitoring con-
trol messages, and these are recorded and synchronized in
a distributed manner in all the participants of the system.
These participants are called miners or peers and, in some
specific DLTs, users are charged a transaction fee to perform
(crypto) transactions. In addition, DLTs allow the storage
of all transaction into immutable records and every record
distributed across many participants. Thus, security in DLTs
comes from the distributed characteristic, but also the use
of strong public-key cryptography and strong cryptographic
hashes.
The benefits of the integration of DLTs into IoT monitoring
systems include: i) guarantee of immutability and transparency
for environmental sensing data; ii) removal of the need for
third parties; iii) development of a transparent system for
heterogeneous IoT monitoring networks to prevent tampering
and injection of fake data from the stakeholders.
In this article, we describe and analyze the tradeoffs of the
integration of DLTs into the narrowband Internet of Things
(NB-IoT), which currently is the leading cellular IoT technol-
ogy [3]. NB-IoT is one of the most efficient low-power wide-
area network (LPWAN) technologies in terms of coverage,
battery life-time, and support for massive machine-to-machine
communications (i.e., scalability) [4]. A feature that makes
NB-IoT more suitable than other technologies to support DLT
traffic is its high downlink and uplink capacity when compared
to other LPWANs such as LoRaWAN or Sigfox [5]. For
instance, the suitability of LoRaWAN to support DLT traffic is
mainly limited by its modest data rates and its 1 percent duty
cycling (i.e., nodes must be idle 99 percent of the time) [2].
Conversely, NB-IoT has been designed with adaptable data
rates and high flexibility, bringing significant advantages to
sensing and monitoring networks. For instance, NB-IoT can be
configured to use a wide range of sub-carrier spacing settings,
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Fig. 1: General DLT-enabled NB-IoT pollution monitoring architecture
which allows the protocol to be tailored for the specific
deployment scenario and data rates can be increased 12 times
by allocating multiple sub-carriers to the devices. NB-IoT
provides extended coverage low-power devices with battery
life-time up to 15 years [3]. Besides, NB-IoT is optimized
for regular and small data transmissions, so it is well suited
for monitoring devices acting as air quality, gas, and water
meters [6].
We aim for a full integration where the NB-IoT devices
generate transactions and receive the corresponding confirma-
tions, but do not act as Blockchain nodes. Such integration is
analogous to the P2 protocol described by Danzi et. al [7],
which provides end-to-end (E2E) security and trust without
increasing the storage and computation load of IoT devices. On
the downside, such integration raises the following questions:
i) how does Blockchain consensus and synchronization affect
the NB-IoT connectivity in terms of uplink and downlink
traffic and end-to-end (E2E) latency? and ii) which trade-
offs arise from integrating DLTs into NB-IoT monitoring
systems? For instance, the traffic patterns generated by DLTs
are different to traditional IoT traffic, where the ratio of uplink
(UL) to downlink (DL) data is oftentimes small. That is, most
of the data is usually transmitted from the NB-IoT devices to
the network to be stored and processed. Instead, the need to
maintain a ledger for all the participants increases the amount
of data transmitted from the base station (i.e., DL).
To answer these above questions, we first describe in detail
the essential elements of an integrated Blockchain and NB-
IoT system that addresses the problem of trust and privacy
(Section II-A). Then, we discuss and analyze the relevant
characteristics of popular DLTs platforms such as Bitcoin,
Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric, and IoTA, and select the most
promising to integrate into IoT environment monitoring sys-
tems. Additionally, we provide an overview of the operation
of NB-IoT. Finally, we investigate the suitability of NB-IoT to
connect the physical monitoring system with the Blockchain
in two specific use cases, namely data authorization and real-
time (i.e., timely) monitoring of gas emissions (Section III).
In particular, we analyze and evaluate the effect of Blockchain
in NB-IoT monitoring systems in terms of traffic balance (DL
to UL), communication overhead, and E2E latency, measured
as the transaction confirmation time.
Our results, obtained from extensive experiments, show that
the mining and consensus mechanisms allow Blockchain nodes
to reach a secure and tamper-resistant consensus in collected
sensing data. On the downside, we observed an increase in
the amount of DL data and E2E latency, in the order of a
few seconds, when compared to traditional NB-IoT packet
transmissions. Despite these minor drawbacks, we consider
that Blockchain and NB-IoT can have a symbiotic relationship
3to provide data integrity, trust, security, transparency, and
public availability for a wide range of monitoring systems with
a minimal impact on energy-efficiency.
In particular, the contributions of this work are threefold.
First, we present a Blockchain-powered IoT framework for
environmental monitoring systems that addresses the prob-
lem of trust and privacy. Second, we evaluate the proposed
framework via extensive experiments, in which the NB-IoT
monitoring system and a suitable DLT platform are integrated.
Third, realizing the lack of studies on communication aspects
of current Blockchain-enabled IoT systems, we analyze and
evaluate the interaction between Blockchain and the NB-
IoT monitoring systems in terms of overall throughput, E2E
latency, and communication overhead via two case studies.
Regarding previous studies [8], to our best knowledge, these
studies mainly focus on specific-applications of Blockchain-
enabled IoT, and how to integrate Blockchain with IoT. In our
studies, communication aspects between Blockchain nodes and
IoT devices are investigated.
II. BLOCKCHAIN-POWERED IOT MONITORING SYSTEMS
In this section, we describe the essential architectural ele-
ments for integration of Blockchain into NB-IoT monitoring
systems, evaluate the numerous DLT alternatives, and give a
brief overview of the operation of NB-IoT.
A. Essential architectural elements
The overall integrated system consists of 4 key components:
DLT network, physical sensors, edge network, and external
resources, as illustrated in Fig. 1. These components are
described in following.
DLT Network: This component includes all modules to
build various features of Blockchain technologies such as
consensus, smart contract, data authorization, identity man-
agement, and peer-to-peer (P2P) communication. These com-
ponents must ensure that every change to the ledger is reflected
in all copies in seconds or minutes and provide mechanisms
for the secure storage of the data generated by IoT devices
and parameter configurations. There are numerous DLTs with
different characteristics that may be beneficial for different
target applications. The DLT nodes can be located everywhere
and connected with NB-IoT base stations via the Internet.
Physical Sensors: The set of resource-limited devices
which have the responsibility of collecting environmental data
such as temperature, humidity, gas emissions and air quality
levels. The collected data are transmitted to edge nodes or base
stations, which can be static, such as access points, gateways,
or mobile terminals, such as drones and mobile devices.
Edge Network: Even though DLT-based solutions offer
significant countermeasures to secure data from tampering and
support the distributed nature of the IoT, the massive amount
of generated data from sensors and the high energy consump-
tion required to verify transactions make these procedures
unsuitable to execute directly on resource-limited IoT devices.
Instead, edge servers with high computation resources can be
used to handle real-time applications and to further increase
the degree of privacy (e.g., through cloud computing) [9].
Scalability
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Throughput
Security
Hyperledger Fabric
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Fig. 2: Performance of four different DLTs in five essential
aspects for IoT monitoring systems dealing with sensitive
information.
The edge network is a potential entity to cooperate with the
Blockchain network in computationally heavy tasks and return
the estimation results (e.g., from solving proof-of-work (PoW)
puzzles, hashing or algorithm encryption) to the Blockchain
network for verification.
External Services: IoT physical devices are resource-
constrained with limited storage space and low computation
capacity. Hence, external infrastructure may be incorporated
to provide external services such as storage and computing.
For example, the Interplanetary File System (IPFS) is a
distributed file storage system that can store data generated
from IoT networks and return a hash to the ledger based
on the content of the data. Since the ledger cannot handle
and store the massive amount of environmental data collected
by the sensors, the services provided by the IPFS are a vital
component.
B. Suitability of different DLTs for IoT monitoring
Although a large number of Blockchain DLTs are available,
the most prominent platforms include Bitcoin, Ethereum,
IOTA, and Hyperledger Fabric. In the following, we com-
pare these DLTs in five different aspects: scalability, latency,
throughput, security, and the level of smart contract function-
alities.
Scalability, latency, and throughput are deeply related and of
vital importance for IoT applications. For instance, the large
number of sensors in smart cities may generate millions of
transactions per day. This requires high efficiency of the con-
sensus mechanism, including the way in which transactions are
processed by the peers, known as endorsing peers in Hyper-
ledger Fabric and full nodes (peers) in Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Regarding latency, the transaction confirmation time must be
sufficiently short to avoid queueing in the Blockchain and
to ensure consistency in the ledgers. Bitcoin and Ethereum
confirmation times per transaction are around 10 minutes and
25 seconds, respectively. These latencies might not be suitable
for real-time IoT monitoring, while the confirmation time of
Fabric and IOTA is much lower [10]. Note that the transaction
4confirmation time is only part of end-to-end latency, as it does
not account for the communication latency at the radio access
network.
The charge of fees to process the transactions, commonly
known as gas is yet another factor to take into account to
select the appropriate DLT. These may greatly increase the
operational costs of the network, which negatively impacts
the throughput of the DLT. On the one hand, transaction fees
pose a problem in massive IoT scenarios if the generation
of a large number of transactions is essential. On the other
hand, these fees may contribute to minimize the amount of
redundant transactions generated by the sensors, which in
turn offloads the Blockchain. Among the considered DLTs,
Ethereum requires fee and gas for each transaction whereas
Hyperledger Fabric and IOTA provide free solutions to ex-
change transactions.
It is clear that IoT applications will involve many stake-
holders with different roles, functionalities, and information
with access rules, identities and security factors. An important
factor to provide security is the support for permissioned and
permissionless (i.e., hybrid) solutions to validate participating
nodes. Both Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric support public
and private solutions, while Bitcoin and IOTA only provide
public ones. Although IoT networks, such as smart cities,
may have a large number of stakeholders willing to contribute
to the security of a permissionless Blockchain network, per-
missioned networks could also be beneficial. For example,
in smart homes where the homeowner wants to validate the
transactions via home miners or validators [11]. Regarding
security, public networks may be more secure than private
ones if these are able to provide transparency and distributed
storage. For instance, in a permissionless Blockchain, the data
is encrypted and stored in all the devices, which makes it
definitely transparent. Besides, the more users a permisionless
Blockchain has, the more secure it is. However, permissionless
Blockchains are not ideal for enterprise use, where companies
deal with highly sensitive data and cannot allow anyone join
their network. A permissioned Blockchain can be altered by
its owners, making it more vulnerable to hacking [12]. In
addition, permissioned Blockchains provide very low or no
fee for validation and a faster consensus process.
Finally, smart contracts act as autonomous entities on the
ledger that deterministically execute logic expressed as func-
tions of the data that are written on the ledger. Therefore,
smart contracts can be established to have automatic reactions
from the DLT network to specific events. For example, in
case of carbon emissions, smart contracts can be used for
real-time policy enforcement upon changes in the emission
patterns. The smart contract feature currently is supported
by Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric (Chaincode). An IOTA
smart contract type called Quobic is still in progress. Besides,
only Hyperledger Fabric supports data confidentially via in-
band encryption and guarantees the privacy of data by creating
private channels. Hyperledger Fabric provides a solution with
various features such as identity management, transaction
integrity and authorization with a trusted CA. These features
are vital in a trusted IoT system. The comparison of the DLTs
mentioned above in these areas illustrated in Fig. 2, where
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Fig. 3: A sequence of message exchanges between DLT with
UEs and eNB.
each aspect has been given an abstract score based on the
previous discussion. Note that the smart contract aspect is a
functionality rather than a strict performance indicator and can
only be scored qualitatively. This makes it different to the rest
of the aspects reflected in Fig. 2, hence, it is shown in a gray
background.
Based on these scores, we decided to implement Hyper-
ledger Fabric as DLT platform for our experiments on IoT
monitoring.
C. DLT traffic over NB-IoT
In the following, we provide a brief description on the
operation of NB-IoT devices, hereafter referred to as user
equipments (UEs), in monitoring applications. NB-IoT UEs
have only two modes of operation, namely radio-resource
control (RRC) idle and RRC connected. In the former, the
UEs can only receive the system information from the BS and,
only in the latter, data can be transmitted. UEs are in idle mode
before initial access to the network, but may also enter this
mode during power saving or after an explicit disconnection
request. To transition from idle to connected mode, the UEs
(clients) must first acquire the basic system information and
synchronization as illustrated in the upper part of Fig. 3. For
this, the UE receives the master information block (MIB-
NB) and the system information blocks 1 (SIB1-NB) and
2 (SIB2-NB). These are transmitted periodically through the
downlink shared channel (DL-SCH) and carry the basic cell
configuration, timing, and access parameters [13]. In addition,
SIB1-NB carries the scheduling information for the rest of the
SIBs.
5After the system information has been acquired, the UEs
must perform the RA procedure to transition to RRC con-
nected mode [14]. The RA procedure is a four-message
handshake, initiated by the UEs by transmitting a single-tone
frequency-hopping pattern, called preamble, through the NB
Physical Random Access Channel (NPRACH). In most cases,
the RA procedure is contention-based, hence, the preamble is
chosen randomly from a predefined pool of up to 48 orthog-
onal sub-carrier frequencies. Consequently, the main reasons
for an access failure are the lack of power in the transmission
and simultaneous transmissions of the same preamble, which
lead to collisions.
After completing the RA procedure, and if the control-plane
(CP) cellular IoT (CIoT) is used, UEs may piggyback short
UL data packets along with the RRC Connection Setup Com-
plete message. Otherwise, the non-access stratum (NAS) setup
must be completed before eNB allocates resources for uplink
transmission through the NB Physical UL Shared Channel
(NPUSCH) and data can be transmitted. The resource unit
(RU) is the basic unit for resource allocation in the NPUSCH
and comprises a set of sub-frames in the time domain and
sub-carriers in the frequency domain. The downlink (DL) data
is transmitted through the NB physical DL shared channel
(PDSCH).
In a traditional NB-IoT monitoring system, the UL data
generated by the UEs is transmitted though the NPUSCH and
routed towards a data center or cloud server to be stored and
processed. At this point, the monitoring system has no control
on the collected data, so modification, corruption, and losses
may occur. Conversely, in our Blockchain-enabled NB-IoT
setup, the uplink data generated by the UEs is transmitted to
a randomly chosen group of endorsing peers of Hyperledger
Fabric as transaction proposals. Then, each of the peers
signs the transaction using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) and adds the signature before returning
the signed message back to the UEs. The peers that provide
an endorsement of the proposed ledger send an update to the
application, but do not immediately apply the proposed update
to their copy of the ledger. Instead, a response is sent back
to the UEs to confirm that the transaction proposal is correct,
has not been previously submitted to ledger, and has a valid
signature. Therefore, the security increases with the number of
endorsing peers. In addition, smart contracts can be executed
to update or query the ledger. A simple example of a smart
contract in air pollution monitoring systems would be to set
the system to calculate average values of the collected data
and to generate an alarm message whenever these exceed a
predefined threshold.
Then, the UEs broadcast the confirmed transaction proposals
along with the response (confirmation) to the ordering ser-
vice. The received transactions are ordered chronologically
to create blocks. These blocks of transactions are delivered
to all the peers for validation. The peers append the block
to the ledger, and the valid transactions are committed to
the current state database. Finally, a confirmation message
is emitted and transmitted back to the UEs to notify that
the submitted transaction has been immutably published to
the ledger. In our previous work [2], we have shown that
Fig. 4: Blockchain-enabled NB-IoT implementation and setup.
two-way wireless communication is required to enable high
decentralization. In communication aspects, we studied and
analyzed DLT traffic in both uplink and downlink over IoT
networks. The confirmation serves as proof that a transaction
executed and recorded in distributed ledger. This confirmation
helps to check for errors or strange occurrences, for example,
in retail industry, the confirmation support to detect the number
of items re-bought, etc. Then, it is fed into the overall retail
system, inventory system, and more are updated. Furthermore,
if the sensors do not receive confirmation from the distributed
ledger, the next action depends on specific applications and
configuration. We can configure the NB-IoT sensor just to
collect sensing information and publish to the distributed
ledger without waiting for receiving any feedback. However,
it is a trade-off between overheads and security. In reality, the
confirmation message might include not only the confirmation
from the distributed ledger to sensor but also execution com-
mands generated autonomously defined by smart contracts.
III. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we evaluate the performance of an integrated
Blockchain and IoT monitoring system with Hyperledger
Fabric and NB-IoT under two use cases. The first one focuses
on the data authentication aspect provided by Blockchain. We
then extend the use case to include smart contracts to processes
the sensor measurements. Our experimental setup is based
on Hyperledger Fabric v1.4, NB-IoT development kits Sara
EVK N211, and one NB-IoT Amarisoft eNB station, and is
illustrated in Fig. 4.
A. Use case 1: Data Authorization
The focus of this use case is to evaluate the communica-
tion overhead of data authentication in our setup. Our setup
includes a single UE with a single sensor that follows the
procedure described in Section II-C; illustrated in Fig. 3. The
metric we use to evaluate the communication efficiency is the
average UL to DL data traffic ratio, where only data packets
are considered.
The size of the payload in the transmitted packets plays a
vital role in the performance of DLT-based NB-IoT systems.
Therefore, we varied the UL payload size from 50 B to 200 B
and set the UE to generate a total of 1000 transactions (i.e.,
UL data packets). The DL payload size is set to 31 B, so the
UL payload size is at least 1.61 times the DL payload size, and
the block size is configured to 30 transactions per block. We
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Fig. 5: Average ratio of UL and DL traffic per transaction with
different payload sizes and numbers of endorsing peers E.
ran our experiments with different number of endorsing peers
in the DLT network E to observe the communication overhead
of an increase in security, which, naturally, increases with E.
Our results are presented in Fig. 5, where it can be seen
that, naturally, the average UL to DL traffic ratio increases
with the UL payload size. However, this increase is more rapid
with traditional NB-IoT than with Blockchain and the average
UL to DL traffic ratio decreases as E increases. For instance,
with an UL payload size of 50 B, and E = 2, the DL traffic
is almost twice as high as the UL traffic. The reason for this
is that, certainly, the average traffic increases with the number
of endorsing peers E, but the increase in DL traffic is much
greater than the increase in UL traffic. Hence, these results
highlight the fact that the use of DLTs heavily increases the
traffic load in the DL channels of IoT networks, namely, in
the PDSCH of NB-IoT.
B. Use case 2: Real-time Monitoring of Air Pollution
We now study the specific use case of a real-time CO2
emission monitoring system that includes smart contracts in
the DLT. The environment data is collected by S8 Miniature
10000 ppm CO2 sensors in the UEs; a simple smart contract is
defined to compute the average CO2 level and trigger updates
to the ledgers when these levels are abnormally high.
The environment data is collected once every 10 seconds
by S8 Miniature 10000 ppm CO 2 sensors in the UEs; a
simple smart contract is defined to compute the average indoor
levels of CO2 and to trigger updates to the ledgers when these
levels are abnormally high. Note that high indoor CO2 levels
are greatly correlated to human metabolic activity and can
cause headaches or make the population to function at lower
activity levels. Nevertheless, the CO2 emissions generated by
working equipment (e.g., computers, machines, etc.), also have
an impact on total amount of CO2 emissions. Our experiments
on CO2 and NOx data were conducted using the same methods
to collect and process the data. Hence, the type of sensor does
not affect the generated traffic and system process.
Fig. 6: E2E latency of our Blockchain-enabled NB-IoT mon-
itoring system.
The focus in this use case is to evaluate the E2E latency,
defined as the time elapsed from the generation of a transaction
at the IoT device until its verification. This includes the latency
at the NB-IoT radio link and at the DLT, which comprises the
execution time of the smart contract and transaction verifica-
tion. Therefore, the E2E latency of smart contract execution
depends on the numerous parameters such as block size and
transaction generation rate. Among these, we evaluate the
impact of the block size on E2E latency. Our results indicate
that integrating DLTs into NB-IoT monitoring applications
symmetrizes the data traffic by slightly increasing the amount
of data transmitted in the downlink. However, by adequately
choosing the DLT and its parameters, the impact of DLT traffic
on the battery lifetime of NB-IoT nodes may be relatively low
when compared to that of the traffic pattern of the monitoring
application and of the implemented power saving techniques.
Hence, our results can be combined with detailed energy
consumption models that include the different possible states
and power saving techniques of NB-IoT nodes (e.g., [15]) to
estimate their battery lifetime.
In these experiments, we configured two UEs, with one CO2
sensor each, to gather data and upload to the ledger once every
10 s. Our results are shown in Fig. 6, where various block sizes
b, from 10 to 100 transactions per block, were considered; the
E2E latency for traditional NB-IoT packets is included as a
reference.
As expected, Fig. 6 shows that an increase in block size
comes with a slight increase in E2E latency. However, this
increase is minor, even when compared to conventional NB-
IoT packets, and may be suitable for most IoT monitoring
applications. Specifically, the E2E latency is doubled from an
average 0.832 s for conventional NB-IoT to 1.63 s for DLT-
based NB-IoT with block size b = 100 transactions per block.
Naturally, smaller block sizes lead to a smaller E2E latency,
which is comparable to that of conventional NB-IoT, especially
for b = 10. The reason is that the block creation time in
Hyperledger Fabric increases with the increase of the block
size. On the other hand, it is advisable to use small block
7sizes in monitoring applications where even conventional NB-
IoT is close to the upper limit of the acceptable E2E latency
of the system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Monitoring of emissions based with IoT devices requires
sets high demands for data reliability and trustworthiness.
A promising approach in that direction is integration of
a Blockchain into the IoT system. We have implemented
Blockchain into an environmental monitoring system based
on NB-IoT, analyzed the tradeoffs and evaluated the perfor-
mance.Our results show that the integration of Blockchain
increases the load in the downlink (DL) channel of NB-
IoT, unlike the plain variant of NB-IoT that does not use
Blockchain. Furthermore, both the level of security and the
DL traffic load increase with the number of endorsing peers
in Hyperledger. Besides, the E2E latency of the monitoring
system increases slightly with the block size. This behavior
was expected, but our results show that the increase in E2E
latency is small even when compared to conventional NB-
IoT. Therefore, integrated Blockchain and NB-IoT monitoring
systems provide valuable benefits to a wide range of environ-
mental applications and, in particular, to those that deal with
sensitive information, such as carbon emissions or air pollution
monitoring.
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